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Abstract
A scopic regime constitutes a state of permanent reciprocal observation and
scrutiny among participants. We investigate whether this environment reduces
the disposition effect among retail traders as they are constantly scrutinized
by others, thus driving them to realize and limit their losses. We use two
anonymous data sets, the first from a popular social trading platform (STP)
governed by a scopic regime, and the second from a traditional foreign exchange
broker. STPs allow participants to interact and copy each other’s trades using
mirror trading, thus implicitly creating two groups; trade leaders who execute
unique trades to build their performance record, and copiers who allocate funds
to be managed by the former. We find ample evidence of a weaker disposition
effect among trade leaders in the scopic environment compared to traders in a
traditional setting. Our findings suggest that a state of constant observation and
scrutiny erodes the disposition effect as individuals become more self-conscious
of their actions and limit their losses to avoid tarnishing their public trading
record.
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1. Introduction
“Cut your losses” is an expression said to encourage a person to stop wast-
ing valuable resources on something that is deemed as failing. While this may
seem evidently logical, some individuals do not quite abide by this prescrip-
tion. Shefrin and Statman (1985) termed this phenomenon as the “disposition5
effect,” which represents an investor’s tendency to quickly realize gains and
hold on to losses. This behavior, which has been extensively documented in
the literature (Weber and Camerer, 1998; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Feng
and Seasholes, 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Linnainmaa, 2010; Nolte, 2012), op-
poses rational economic models and has been shown to result in poor financial10
performance (Odean, 1998; Seru et al., 2010). Researchers have identified sev-
eral cognitive illusions and emotional biases that contribute to the disposition
effect, including mental accounting, loss-aversion, regret-aversion, self-control,
and mean-reversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shefrin and Statman, 1985;
Odean, 1998). While these biases cannot be easily removed, individuals can still15
attempt to understand them and aim to prevent such predispositions by adopt-
ing a more systematic analysis of market conditions (Kahneman and Riepe,
1998). Consequently, correcting mechanisms may arise when one obtains a bet-
ter understanding of circumstances (Wegener and Petty, 1995). Several studies
have presented evidence showing that traders can learn from their past trading20
activities to reduce the disposition effect (Shapira and Venezia, 2001; Grinblatt
and Keloharju, 2001; Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Chen et al.,
2007; Boolell-Gunesh et al., 2009; Seru et al., 2010). This argument is based on
the idea that individuals would examine their ex-post performance and sensibly
distinguish and attribute specific poor performing trades to their tendency to25
realize gains prematurely and hold on to losses, thus adjusting for the disposi-
tion effect. Nevertheless, what happens when individuals find themselves in an
environment where their actions are constantly being scrutinized in real-time,
and where poor performance may instantly tarnish their reputation? Under
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such conditions, traders may exhibit a heightened degree of self-consciousness30
such that they become more aware of the negative consequences associated with
poor performance. Hence, traders would adapt their behavior as they tend to
avoid displaying poor decisions by limiting losses instead of holding on to them
— this can be achieved by realizing the loss on an open positions to avoid fur-
ther loss — and seek to realize larger gains in order to showcase their superior35
trading skills. Consequently, an environment that promotes constant scrutiny
is expected to erode the disposition effect.
In a traditional financial setting, institutional investors typically circumvent
constant scrutiny by the use of formal structured contracts that outline how
much and what type of information is disclosed on predetermined dates. For40
instance, mutual funds are generally required to disclose their holdings only on
a quarterly basis (Haslem, 2007), while disclosure by hedge funds is voluntary
(Anson, 2002). Moreover, individual traders in a traditional setting tend to
keep their strategies and holdings private. In recent years, however, the rising
popularity of social media has reshaped the way individuals access and partici-45
pate in financial markets through new channels of communication, information
sharing, and investing. One particular phenomenon that has attracted an in-
creasing number of retail traders is social trading, which embeds the traditional
online trading model into a social media network. This novel concept has been
acclaimed for the high level of information transparency and disclosure that50
occurs in real-time, and the tools that are provided by these social trading plat-
forms (STPs), which allow participants to interact with each other and even
copy each other’s trades using a mirror trading algorithm that is provided by
the platform. We call this environment a “scopic regime,” which designates
a state of permanent reciprocal observation and scrutiny among participants55
(Knorr Cetina, 2003). We use this term in an interdisciplinary fashion to distin-
guish the trading environment on STPs from traditional trading settings. The
notion of a scopic regime is meant to characterize the organization of an activity,
such as trading, where participants reciprocally observe each other’s actions and
receive information in real time about the decisions of other participants. For60
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instance, under the traditional organization of the trading floor, traders on the
New York Stock Exchange could not directly observe the decisions of traders
on the London Stock Exchange. Under a scopic regime, embodied by the in-
tegration of social media within the trading process, traders in London, New
York, and elsewhere can reciprocally observe each other’s actions in real time.65
Furthermore, there has been heightened interest in how participation in social
media changes the attitudes, behavior, and the decisions of individuals. Ex-
perimental field studies conducted outside the sphere of finance show increased
emotional contagion, as well as polarization of opinions among social media par-
ticipants (Kramer et al., 2014; Coviello et al., 2014; Bail et al., 2018). Within70
the broader context of such findings, it is relevant to understand the impact of
social media on decision making in financial markets.
Participants on STPs can be divided into two main groups, which we label
as trade leaders and copiers. The former are typically aspiring money managers
who invest the funds allocated to them by the latter in return for monetary75
compensation that may be directly or indirectly based on performance. Copiers
can allocate their funds using the mirror trading algorithm by easily and explic-
itly copying the future trades of another participant with a click of a button,
thus receiving a price identical to that received by the copied participant. Nev-
ertheless, our study focuses on the behavior of trade leaders. We define a trade80
leader as an individual who only personally enters trades into the STP. In other
words, a trade leader is someone who executes original trades and refrains from
explicitly copying others.
Given this definition, we use a unique data set from a highly popular STP,
which we call SocialTrade, with around 2.5 million trades executed by 77,47685
trade leaders in 2013 to test whether exposure to a scopic environment decreases
the disposition effect. We adopt two methods: 1) the disposition spread pro-
posed by Odean (1998), which estimates a trader’s propensity to realize gains
relative to losses, and 2) the Cox proportional hazards model, which allows us to
control for trade-specific characteristics. Furthermore, we compare the results90
obtained for trade leaders on SocialTrade to those of traders on an anonymous
4
traditional online trading platform, which we call TradeStream, where trading
activity is kept private. We use the full data sets as well as subsets with over-
lapping periods and common assets in order to examine whether the difference
in disposition of traders between the two platforms is due to the characteristics95
of the trading environment. Data limitations do not allow us to identify and ex-
amine distinctly comparable subgroups of traders on the two trading platforms
or control for demographic effects, such as age, gender and occupation among
others. However, given the global popularity of SocialTrade, and the large num-
ber of traders in both data sets, we work on the assumption that traders on both100
platforms come from similar demographic distributions. In other words, traders
on the two platforms are assumed to inherently have similar propensities to ex-
hibit the disposition effect; thus any difference in disposition levels between the
two platforms can be attributed to the effect of the trading environment. Sup-
porting evidence for this assumption is provided by Heimer (2016) who finds no105
significant difference in the characteristics of traders between those who joined
the STP and those who never joined.
In general, both methods show that trade leaders exhibit a weaker disposition
effect compared to traders on the traditional trading platform. This evidence
supports our argument that the scopic regime, through its state of constant110
reciprocal scrutiny, creates a correcting mechanism that erodes the disposition
effect. As such, trade leaders under a scopic regime become self-conscious about
their actions and more aware of the negative consequences associated with poor
performance on their reputation, and thus choose to close losing positions in
order to avoid holding unjustifiable paper losses.115
On the one hand, our finding is in agreement with the popular argument in
the literature that, while the disposition effect arises from cognitive illusions,
individuals can learn and adjust their behavior in aim of preventing such pre-
dispositions (Kahneman and Riepe, 1998; Shapira and Venezia, 2001; Grinblatt
and Keloharju, 2001; Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Chen120
et al., 2007; Boolell-Gunesh et al., 2009; Seru et al., 2010). Hence, correcting
mechanisms develop as individuals become more conscious about their affinity
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towards holding on to a losing asset, prompting an alteration of their behavior
from loss-averse to risk-averse (Wegener and Petty, 1995). In other words, the
scopic regime results in an adjustment to the utility function of individuals, such125
that it is more symmetrical between losses and gains. Our paper shows that
the scopic regime places individuals under a constant spotlight of scrutiny, and
that this state gives rise to a heightened sense of self-consciousness, which makes
individuals more aware of the financial as well as reputational risks associated
with holding on to losing investments.130
On the other hand, our results differ from those of Heimer (2016), who ex-
amines a sample of retail traders on an STP, and shows that social interaction
contributes to the disposition effect. The author links this relationship to im-
pression management, whereby a trader’s self-image increases their tendency to
exhibit the disposition effect since the appearance of success attracts attention135
to their profile and enables more persuasive interaction with others through
peer-to-peer messaging. This argument suggests that the audience viewing
the trader’s profile primarily focuses on realized profits and disregards paper
losses, even though the latter are displayed on the trader’s profile. Contrast-
ingly, the evidence in our paper shows that the scopic regime increases one’s140
self-consciousness and awareness about exhibiting unjustifiable losses, such that
they tend to realize and limit their losses. Nevertheless, there are several key
differences between the datasets used by the author and the ones used in this
study, which may explain the divergent conclusions.
First, Heimer (2016) uses data obtained from an STP, where retail foreign145
exchange traders can link their existing brokerage account to their social account
on the STP. This process differs compared to that adopted by SocialTrade,
which provides both the social as well as the brokerage services to traders, thus
ensuring homogeneity with respect to the quality of services and price quotes.
Nevertheless, Heimer (2016) finds that the effect of the STP environment on150
the disposition effect remains largely the same after controlling for brokerage
fixed-effects.
A second key difference is that during the period of investigation in the au-
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thor’s study, the mirror trading feature was not yet available to traders on the
STP.1 This means that traders in the author’s sample did not have a monetary155
incentive to build a performance reputation — as they do on SocialTrade —
but instead only benefited from increased social interaction. While a growing
social network and an increase in the number of peer-to-peer messages may add
some positive utility with respect to an individual’s reputation, we argue that
a monetary incentive would have a more significant impact on one’s reputation.160
In other words, traders are more likely to be self-conscious of and alter their
behavior when there is a monetary reward (or penalty) compared to when the
consequence is simply a change in the number of social interactions they en-
counter from anonymous individuals. In the sample used by Heimer (2016),
traders did not have a monetary incentive to build a reputation, nor were they165
(directly or indirectly) penalized for poor performance. Since these traders did
not have anything to lose in terms of financial remuneration related to repu-
tation, they might not have deemed an outstanding unrealized losing position
to have a significant detrimental impact on their reputation and compensation.
In contrast, trade leaders on SocialTrade receive monetary compensation for170
superior performance, and are thus more likely to limit losses in order to avoid
exhibiting any image of poor performance.
Third, the sample used by Heimer (2016) only includes participants who
traded both before and after joining the STP, resulting in around one million
transactions executed by 2,598 participants from early 2009 until December175
2010. While such a sample setup controls for unobservable demographic char-
acteristics between the control group (pre-joining the STP) and the test group
(post-joining the STP), it results in selection bias since only traders who sur-
vived and opted to join the STP were considered in the analysis. As such, traders
who survived are likely to have better performance through realized gains, which180
contributes to a higher disposition effect. Moreover, these individuals may have
1The author has confirmed that mirror trading was not available on the STP during the
time of his study, but was introduced at a later stage.
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altered their behavior over time by learning from their past experiences. On
the contrary, our study employs two separate data sets of traders who trade in
an overlapping period. Nevertheless, we make a key assumption that the two
data sets have equivalent demographic distributions, and individuals on both185
platforms inherently exhibit similar psychosocial tendencies. This implies that
any difference in behavior between the two platforms can be attributed to the
effect of the trading environment.
Finally, with respect to the methodology, Heimer (2016) applies a discrete-
time model, where the dependent variable is recorded at ten-minute intervals,190
and takes the value of one if the trader reduced his holdings in the asset and
zero otherwise. We argue in section 3.2 that the time interval used is arbitrary
and may lead to loss of information, especially when the transactions are time-
stamped. Moreover, the author uses trader fixed-effects, which may lead to
model overfitting. In this study, however, we use a continuous-time Cox model195
with trader random-effects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a detailed
description of social trading platforms. Section 3 presents the two empirical
methods that are used. Section 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the two
data sets. Section 5 is dedicated to the discussion of the results. Finally, section200
6 concludes the study.
2. Mechanics of STPs
STPs are founded on the notions of complete disclosure and free flow of
information regarding participants’ profile details as well as their current and
historical trading activities. This differentiates STPs from traditional financial205
environments and financial institutions, such as mutual funds and hedge funds,
where performance is only disclosed quarterly by the former and voluntarily
by the latter. The high level of mandatory disclosure on STPs facilitates the
constant scrutiny of traders, which is an environment we call a scopic regime,
and has attracted a growing crowd of retail traders towards a more transparent210
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market. While the main goal of STPs is to promote transparency, there is
surprisingly little information regarding the size of this market since this data
is held by the STP firm, which typically does not want to disclose the size of its
operations due to competitive reasons. In addition, the concept of an STP can
take many shapes and forms, and is constantly changing2, thus STPs can have215
different social trading features not only amongst each other, but also over time.
Nevertheless, we provide some figures that are only a speculative estimate of the
size of the STP market. The website Social Trading Guru lists 25 leading STPs
that offered automated trade copying during 2017, with another nine platforms
that focus on social networking and content aggregation only.3 Some STPs220
publish the number users on their platforms, which can range from 100,000
to over seven million.4 However, these figures often represent the number of
registered accounts (i.e. opened accounts) and not the number of active traders,
which can be significantly smaller and not as attractive to advertise.
STPs incentivize information sharing through compensation schemes where225
trade leaders can earn monetary benefits for managing their copiers’ wealth. The
compensation schemes offered by STPs can differ greatly, as they can depend
on a range of key performance indicators (Doering et al., 2015). Some STPs
adopt a performance-based compensation scheme where traders are rewarded
depending on the return they generate for their copiers. Other platforms employ230
a neo-asset-based scheme that links the trader’s remuneration to the number of
copiers attracted, instead of the amount of assets under management. Doering
et al. (2015) argue that the latter remuneration model decreases moral hazard
as trade leaders have an incentive to build a good yet persistent track record in
order to attract an increasing number of copiers. While STPs may change the235
models and metrics used for compensating traders, the scheme adopted by the
STP in this study during the period of investigation is a function of the num-
2For example, the STP used by Heimer (2016) added the copy trading feature after the
period investigated by the author.
3See http://socialtradingguru.com/networks/social-trading-networks.
4See http://blog.thomasbrand.xyz/2017/10/19/what-does-social-trading-and-
investing-mean-in-practice/.
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ber of copiers attracted, contingent on these copiers having a minimum balance
and a certain number of trades executed per month.5 This implies that the
compensation offered by the STP in this study is not directly linked to perfor-240
mance, but rather to how skilled a trade leader is perceived by potential copiers.
Hence, trade leaders are likely to become more aware of the financial as well as
reputational risks associated with poor performance. The discussion about the
compensation scheme serves to highlight the potential for increased sensitivity
to reputational risk that individuals are subject to under a scopic regime — a245
risk factor associated with the potential loss of an entity’s reputational capital,
which has been found to significantly impact a fund manager’s compensation in
the hedge fund industry (Fung and Hsieh, 1999; Boyson, 2010).
In general, participants open an account on an STP that is directly linked to
a brokerage account, or they can link their existing brokerage account to an STP,250
such as the platform used in the study by Heimer (2016). Next, they update
their personal information on their profile page, which is publicly disclosed on
the platform. Whenever participants execute a trade on an STP, they transmit
a trade signal, which is defined as a set of rules to buy or sell a certain asset once
the price reaches a predetermined level. The details of every trade are recorded255
on a participant’s profile page in real time, such that all historical realized profits
and losses as well as current unrealized profits and losses on open positions are
publicly disclosed. This means that a trader’s true performance is constantly
on display, and cannot be gamed by simply deferring the realization of losses.
We define a trade leader as an individual who only executes personal trades and260
refrains from explicitly copying the trades of others using the mirror trading
algorithm provided by the platform. This group generally includes traders who
aspire to become leaders by building their reputation and displaying their skills
through the trades they execute. By doing so, they attract potential copiers
in hopes of earning performance compensation depending on the remuneration265
5We cannot provide specific details of these parameters without revealing the identity of
the STP, which breaches our non-disclosure agreement.
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scheme offered by the platform. Moreover, STPs usually use a proprietary
ranking algorithm that enables them to feature the profiles of the top performing
traders in real-time. This places these individuals in the spotlight and renders
them highly susceptible to scrutiny.
Conversely, copiers are individuals who wish to have their capital managed270
by others. They evaluate the performance of trade leaders and identify those
who adopt a trading strategy that best suits their own investment goals and risk
appetite. Any additional information that copiers may wish to attain in order to
reduce uncertainty concerning the identity and authenticity of the trade leaders
can be collected via direct contact with the latter through instant messaging275
tools and discussion posts. This can result in a close, personal, and informal
relationship between the parties involved. After copiers evaluate the profile and
performance of the different trade leaders, they can then set up their accounts
to automatically copy the trades of specific trade leaders in real-time using the
mirror trading algorithm offered by the STP. In other words, trades executed280
by the trade leader are instantaneously executed in the copier’s account at a
price identical to that received by the trade leader, without the need for manual
confirmation. Unless copiers choose to be involved in the daily investment pro-
cess, it is unnecessary for them to interfere except for terminating the copying
relationship. Conversely, if copiers choose to remain involved in the investment285
process but are unable to conduct a thorough investment analysis, they may
decide to copy only certain trades after evaluating the rationale behind them
by clicking on the copy button pertaining to each trade.
Trading on STPs requires opening a position via a standardized Contract
for Difference (CFD) that is written on an asset, since traders on STPs do not290
trade the actual asset. A CFD is an electronic contract between a trader and
a CFD provider (or broker), which entails that the trader relinquish physical
possession of the underlying asset for a contract with the CFD provider who
offers an identical economic exposure (Norman, 2009). CFDs are considered
derivative instruments that enable traders to obtain exposure to, and speculate295
on the direction of the asset, without ownership requirements. The payoff from
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the CFD is equal to the difference between the price of the underlying asset at
the time of opening the position and the price at which the contract is closed.
Thus, a trader with a long (short) position in a CFD would profit if the price of
the underlying asset rises (falls). Trading in CFDs implies that pocketing a gain300
or limiting a loss requires one to realize the open profit or loss, respectively, on a
position. Moreover, CFDs are traded on margin, thus the trader may deposit an
amount of capital that is significantly smaller than the asset’s notional value,
which may lead to exceedingly leveraged positions. Traders must constantly
maintain a sufficient amount of capital in their accounts in order to satisfy the305
minimum required margin established by the broker, otherwise their positions
may be liquidated.
3. Methodology
We employ two methods for estimating the disposition effect: the first was
developed by Odean (1998) to calculate the disposition spread, and the second310
method is based on the Cox proportional hazards model.
3.1. Disposition Spread
To investigate whether the scopic regime decreases individuals’ propensity
to sell profitable trades and hold on to losing ones, we look at the frequency
with which they realize gains and losses relative to their opportunities to close315
each of these positions. Following Odean (1998), we calculate for each trade
leader i, during the trading period t the realized gains RGit, paper gains PG
i
t,
realized losses RLit, and paper losses PL
i
t in terms of number of trades as well
as net dollar values. It is important to note that most studies in the literature
deal with institutional or individual investors who trade the actual asset, and320
who may hold the asset for a prolonged period. Moreover, the data employed by
these studies show the quarterly holdings of these investors, thus the previously
mentioned parameters are computed on a quarterly basis. In our study on the
contrary, individuals on both platforms trade assets through CFDs, thus they
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do not hold ownership of the assets and they incur overnight fees for positions325
held until the next trading day.6 Additionally, the high levels of leverage of-
fered by the platforms allow traders to benefit from the slightest price swing,
hence, trade durations tend to be short. Due to these reasons, calculating the
above mentioned parameters based on a quarterly data frequency would result
in inappropriate estimates of the disposition effect since traders in our data sets330
are highly likely to close their positions within a few days of opening them. To
illustrate, consider a simple scenario with a single trader who buys two assets
A and B on day one, and that both of these assets appreciate over the next few
days. Assume that the trader closes his position in asset A on day one, and his
position in asset B on day two. If we consider a trading period of one day, we335
would obtain count values for RG and PG equal to one and one, respectively on
day one, and values of one and zero, respectively on day two. Averaging across
these two trading periods would result in RG of one and PG of 0.5. Now, con-
sider the scenario where the trading period is two days; thus, we would obtain
count values for RG and PG of two and zero, respectively. As such, choosing a340
longer trading period in the context of short term trading would mean that most
positions would have been closed, regardless of whether the trade was a win or
a loss. This example clearly shows that the values computed for the realized
and paper gains and losses are highly dependent on the trading period chosen.
Due to this, we compute these parameters for different trading durations as a345
robustness check, where t = [1→ 7] days.
Next, we aggregate the abovementioned parameters across all trade leaders,
and over all trading periods, in order to calculate the proportion of gains realized
(PGR) and the proportion of losses realized (PLR). The two ratios can be
6While we do not have access to the overnight fees charged by the two platforms over the
duration of the analysis, these fees tend to be highly similar across brokers especially in the
foreign exchange market, since they are primarily derived from interbank interest rates. Given
that the comparative analysis between the two trading environments focuses only on foreign
exchange instruments, we work on the assumption that overnight fees on the two platforms
are the same.
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expressed as follows:
PGR =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(
RGit
RGit + PG
i
t
)
and PLR =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(
RLit
RLit + PL
i
t
)
.
The overall disposition spread, DISP , is calculated as the difference between
the two proportions such that DISP = PGR − PLR, where a large positive
(negative) spread means that traders are more willing to realize gains (losses).
The hypothesis to be tested is that traders tend to close winning positions and350
hold on to losing ones, provided that one uses a reasonable trading period. A
one-tailed t-test can determine whether to reject the null hypothesis as follows:
t− statistic = (PLR− PGR)− 0√
PGR(1−PGR)
RG+PG +
PLR(1−PLR)
RL+PL
.
Note that the test for significance in this case counts each realized gain,
paper gain, realized loss, and paper loss as a separate independent observation,
which are then aggregated across all traders. This independence assumption355
may not hold perfectly in the context of social trading, where individuals may
be tempted to imitate each other’s trading activities (Gemayel and Preda, 2018).
As such, the lack of independence will result in an inflated t-statistic; however,
it does not bias the calculated proportions of realized gains and losses. Odean
(1998) argues that when the test statistic is large enough, as presented in our360
results, some lack of independence is not problematic.
Odean (1998) proposes an alternative way of calculating the disposition
spread by making different independence assumptions. Instead of assuming that
independence exists at the trade level, we assume that it only exists at the trader
level. This means that there may exist some form of relationship among the365
proportion of gains and losses realized within a trader’s account but not across
accounts. The PGR and PLR variables are calculated for each trader during
every trading period, and are then differenced to obtain the DISP spread. We
then average this spread for each trader across all trading periods in order to
14
obtain a disposition spread for each trader separately. PGR and PLR for each370
trader-period can be calculated as:
PGRit =
RGit
RGit + PG
i
t
and PLRit =
RLit
RLit + PL
i
t
.
While the first method of calculating the proportions of gains and losses
realized weights each trader by the number of realized and paper gains and
losses, this alternative method weights each trader account equally. As such,
the latter method ignores the fact that traders who are more active and execute375
more transactions have more accurate estimates of their true PGR and PLR
values. Going back to the subject of observation independence, choosing a short
trading period may decrease the likelihood of having correlated trades within
the same trading period; however, this manoeuvre in itself gives rise to another
issue. To elaborate, we draw on our finding that trade leaders on SocialTrade380
and traders on TradeStream have weekly trading frequencies of 1 and 2.15,
respectively. These figures amount to less than one trade a day. For simplicity,
assume a trading period of one day, where a trader opens and closes one trade
within a trading day. Hence, that trader would have either a PGR equal to
one and PLR equal to zero if the trade was a win, or a PGR equal to zero and385
PLR equal to one if the trade was a loss. In these two scenarios, the DISP
spread will take on the value of either 100% or -100%. Odean (1998) notes
that the proportions of realized gains and losses will be smaller for traders who
trade frequently compared to those who trade less frequently. Hence, given that
traders in our two data sets are not likely to have multiple trades opened at390
once within a very short trading period, this results in extreme values for the
DISP spread, which may not reflect the true disposition effect of the trader.
Moreover, as the values of the parameters used in calculating the DISP spread
will be relatively low, this will result in a very low test statistic. While the
test statistics may be somewhat biased and not very reliable when they are395
close to the traditional critical values of significance, the estimated disposition
spreads are not, and provide a sensible starting point to investigate disposition
15
differentials between the two data sets.
One drawback of the disposition spread is that it is not appropriate for
cross-sectional comparisons due to the mechanical relationship between the dis-400
position spread and the size of the portfolio (Odean, 1998; Cici, 2012). To
illustrate, assume that trader A has a portfolio consisting of 12 winners and 12
losers, while trader B has a portfolio with three winners and three losers. More-
over, let both traders be equally influenced by the disposition effect, such that
they are both twice as likely to realize a gain relative to a loss. Therefore, both405
traders would sell two winning assets and one losing asset, resulting in PGR
and PLR values of 2/12 and 1/12, respectively for trader A, and PGR and
PLR values of 2/3 and 1/3, respectively for trader B. Thus, the DISP spread
of trader B is four times that of trader A, despite both traders having the same
propensity to realize winners relative to losers. The disposition ratio, denoted410
by DISP RATIO and calculated as the ratio of PGR to PLR, overcomes this
issue by correctly estimating the disposition to sell winners compared to losers.
Given the limitations of applying the disposition spread and ratio in the
context of short term trading, we also adopt a survival analysis approach to
estimate the disposition effect while controlling for trader characteristics and415
dependence among trades.
3.2. Cox Proportional Hazards Model
Survival analysis has been used by several studies to investigate the dispo-
sition effect, including Feng and Seasholes (2005) and Richards et al. (2017).
We apply survival analysis techniques to measure the rate of event occurrence,420
which in our case is the closing of a trade, in relation to the “origin time” of the
trade. Since our data includes trades that are executed at different points in
time, survival analysis methods allow us to control for such left-truncated data,
for which there is a systematic exclusion of survival times from the sample, and
where the sample itself is dependent on the survival time (Allison, 2010).425
Many of the techniques used in survival analysis assume that time is mea-
sured as a continuous variable; however, such an assumption may lead to com-
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putationally intensive processes. Some researchers have proposed using discrete-
time models, where events are considered to occur at discrete time points. While
this approach may be more computationally manageable, dichotomizing data430
over discrete time intervals may be highly arbitrary and wasteful of information
(Allison, 1982). Heimer (2016) applies a discrete-time method by transforming
timestamped transactions of traders into ten-minute intervals. This approach
is arbitrary because the ten-minute interval does not hold any meaning, and it
ignores the variation on either side of the interval cut-off point. For example,435
a trader who closes a position one minute after the trade exhibits a gain, and
closes a losing position after nine minutes has a higher propensity towards real-
izing gains relative to losses. However, since both these trades are closed within
the ten-minute interval in a discrete-time context, this does not allows us to
differentiate between the disposition to close a position contingent on being a440
gain or a loss.
In order to avoid such subjectivity in selecting an appropriate discrete-time
interval, we use a continuous-time model. Following the seminal work of Cox
(1972), the general transaction-dependent Cox model used for modelling hazard
rates is expressed as:445
λ(t,Xi) = λ0(t)e
β′Xi
= λ0(t)λi
where, λ(t,Xi) is the hazard rate at time t conditional on a set of observed
transaction-specific variables, Xi. The baseline hazard rate, λ0(t), is the hazard
rate when all predictor variables are null. Since transactions executed by a
trader may exhibit dependence, we incorporate into our framework unobserved
individual heterogeneity. Given the set of i transactions that are executed by j450
independent individuals, we denote by bj the random cluster effect that induces
correlation among the transactions in the same cluster j, where we assume that
the random effects b1, . . . , bj are i.i.d. random variables with bj ∼ N(0, σ2).
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The mixed-effects Cox model is expressed as:
λij(t,Xij , Zij) = λ0(t)e
β′Xij+b′jZij
where λ0 is an unspecified baseline hazard function, which is the hazard rate455
when all covariates take on the value of zero. X and Z are the design ma-
trices for the fixed-effects and random-effects, respectively, and β and b are
the fixed-effects and random-effects coefficients, respectively. The hazard rate,
λij(t,Xij , Zij), is the probability density function of the event occurrence at
time t conditional on the survival to that time.460
The survival time in our study is computed in seconds as the difference
between the closing and opening timestamps of each transaction. Moreover, all
positions in both data sets have been closed, meaning that the hazard event has
occurred for all observations. The predictor variables employed in the analysis
include the following:465
• Gain: a dichotomous variable to estimate the disposition effect, which
takes the value of one if the transaction results in a gain and zero if it is
a loss;
• Long: a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one for a long posi-
tion and zero for a short position;470
• T/P : a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the position is
closed due to a take-profit order, and zero otherwise;
• S/L: a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the trade is
closed due to a stop-loss order, and zero otherwise;
• Leverage: a categorical variable that captures the degree of leverage used475
based on the leverage levels offered by the trading platform7; and
7The TradeStream platform offers a fixed leverage ratio of 200 to one, hence we do not
include this variable when fitting the models to this data set.
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• log(Durationi−k): the log transformation of the duration of the previous
k transactions.
We conduct a series of interrelated models on the two data sets. First,
we fit Model (1), where we only use the Gain variable in order to investigate480
whether there is a difference in the magnitude of the disposition effect between
the two trading environments. Next, we run Model (2a) where we include Long,
T/P , S/L, and asset fixed-effects as control variables and allow for interaction
between the Gain and the limit order variables. We run Model (2b) only on the
SocialTrade data set, which further includes the Leverage variable. Model (3)485
further includes monthly time fixed-effects. Model (4) further incorporates the
log(Durationi−k) variable, where k ∈ [1, 2].8 Finally, Model (5) further includes
trader random-effects. We conduct these analyses for each data set separately,
and then repeat them for subsets that are selected by only considering the
overlapping time frame and the common assets traded on the two platforms.490
As a robustness check, we pool the data from the two platforms — we
first do this for the full data sets and then for the common subsets — and
create a dummy variable called STP that is equal to one if the trade was
executed on SocialTrade and zero if it was executed on TradeStream. We then
repeat the previously-mentioned models by including the STP parameter and495
its interactions with the other variables in order to explicitly estimate the effect
of the trading environment on the hazard rate of the trade. All the results and
conclusions obtained in the pooled analysis are similar to those reported for
each data set separately. However, it is not feasible to estimate Model (5) using
pooled data since there would be perfect correlation between the STP variable500
and the trader effects. In addition, our results show that after including trader
effects, the Gain coefficient changes significantly for all data sets considered,
which highlights the importance of accounting for this effect. Thus, due to
spatial limitations, the largely similar results and conclusions we obtain for the
8Adding higher order autoregressive terms of the log(Duration) variable does not impact
the significance of the parameters, nor does it improve the explanatory power of the models.
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separate and pooled analyses, and the infeasibility of including both platform505
and trader effects, we do not report the results of the pooled regressions and
instead focus the discussion on each data set separately.
For all the estimated models, we report the concordance index or Harrell’s
C, which is one of the most widely used performance metrics for survival models
(Harrell, 2013). This measure is interpreted as the probability of concordance510
between the predicted and the actual survival times (Harrell et al., 1982). We
also report the Pseudo-R2, which is calculated as 1− exp((χ2LR)/n), where χ2LR
is the chi-square statistic for the likelihood ratio test for the overall model, and
n is the total number of observations.
A final note regarding the Cox model used in this study is that it ignores the515
price path of assets — which is also a drawback of the disposition spread. This
means that we do not capture the behavior of the trader between the opening
and closing times of a trade. For example, consider an open position where
the profit alternates between a gain and a loss with an equal probability as
the price of the asset fluctuates. One might claim that a trader exhibiting the520
disposition effect would realize the gain at the first occurrence. Nevertheless, we
argue that the ultimate decision of the trader, manifested by the closing of the
position, represents the true disposition of the trader. Hence, even if a trader
had one position displaying a loss and another displaying a gain throughout
their durations, with both positions being finally closed at a gain, this means525
that the trader has a tendency to realize gains more than losses regardless of the
price path of the asset. Tracking the open profit of all trades for all traders in
our data sets requires a great deal of computational power and access to market
price data from the two platforms, which is not available to us. Using a third
party price source may not be representative of what traders actually observed530
on the platforms due to different order books, spreads, and trading activity. As
such, we end this discussion here and assert that the decision to close a position
by the trader represents their true disposition.
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4. Data
To compare the disposition effect of traders under a scopic and a traditional535
trading environment, we use two unique proprietary data sets where the first is
obtained from a popular STP, which we call SocialTrade, and the second from
a traditional online retail foreign exchange broker, which we call TradeStream.
Data limitations in this paper do not allow us to identify and examine dis-
tinctly comparable subgroups of traders on the two trading platforms or control540
for demographic effects. However, given the global popularity of SocialTrade,
and the large size of both data sets, we work on the assumption that traders
on both platforms come from similar demographic distributions. Consequently,
traders on both platforms are assumed to inherently have similar propensities to
exhibit the disposition effect. This means that any variation in disposition levels545
between the two platforms can be attributed to the effect of the trading envi-
ronment. Supporting evidence for our argument is presented by Heimer (2016)
who shows that traders who join the STP early on are not statistically different
from those who join later with regards to characteristics such as age, experience,
location, and trading style. A similar conclusion was also found when the au-550
thor compared his sample of traders prior to joining the STP to another sample
of traders who never joined the STP. Hence, we adopt this evidence in support
of our assumption that the demographic characteristics of individuals and their
inherent tendency to exhibit the disposition effect are the same for traders on
both platforms, regardless of when they open their trading account.555
4.1. Data from SocialTrade
The first data set is obtained from an anonymous yet highly popular STP,
which we call SocialTrade, and contains over 63 million trades executed by
all participants during 2013. Participants can trade in a wide range of assets
including currencies, commodities, equities, and indices. The STP records the560
details of each transaction, including the opening and closing prices, amount
traded, leverage used, direction, as well as the opening and closing timestamps.
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Since we aim to study the disposition effect of traders who execute personal
trades and refrain from explicitly copying others, we select trade leaders by
applying a strict criterion where only participants whose trades were all entered565
personally into the platform during 2013 are included in our sample. Note that
traders can execute a mix of personal and copied trades; however, we consider
these individuals to be copiers who allocate part of their capital to be managed
by trade leaders, yet reserve a portion for personal trading.
The final sample contains around 2.5 million trades executed by 77,476 trade570
leaders. We present some descriptive statistics in Table I. Trades can be cat-
egorized based on the asset traded as follows: currencies constitute 83.14% of
trades, whereas commodities, equities, and indices make up 11.21%, 3.6% and
2.05%, respectively. Moreover, around 63% of these trades are personally closed
by the traders, while 22% and 13% are triggered by stop-loss and take-profit575
orders, respectively. Next, we compute several trading characteristics, which
are first averaged across trades of each trader and then across all trade leaders.
On average, we find that trade leaders engage in both long (66.11%) and short
positions, and employ a leverage ratio of 175 to one. With respect to the dura-
tion of trades, trade leaders keep positions open for an average of six days. The580
average frequency of annual trades across trade leaders is around 34, which is
considerably low compared to that of the full population of participants (207).
This suggests that trade leaders are more aware of the impact of transaction
costs on profits. Finally, we find that trade leaders are more specialized since
they trade in a fewer number of assets (3.6 on average) compared to the full585
population of participants (6.5).
4.2. Data from TradeStream
The second data set is obtained from an anonymous foreign exchange broker,
which we call TradeStream, and contains around 6.9 million trades in 22 cur-
rency pairs, executed by 22,545 traders over the period January 2011 to Septem-590
ber 2013. TradeStream does not offer participants any social trading features
such as mirror trading, thus we consider all trades to be unique. Around 66.48%
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of trades are personally closed by traders while 14.41% and 19.11% of trades are
closed due to stop-loss and take-profit orders, respectively. Moreover, we calcu-
late several trader characteristics, which are first averaged across trades of each595
trader, and then across all traders. We present these statistics in Table II. On
average, we find that 47% of a trader’s positions on the TradeStream platform
are buys, which is around 20% less compared to trade leaders on SocialTrade.
We find that the average trade duration on TradeStream is around 1.19 days,
which is less than the duration of trades on SocialTrade. This means that most600
traders on TradeStream are day traders who close their positions at the end of
the trading day. As such, they tend to minimize their exposure to overnight
fluctuations in prices. With respect to the average number of annual trades,
we report a figure of around 111 trades, which is almost three times the value
reported for trade leaders on SocialTrade. Given that traders on TradeStream605
are day traders, the higher trade frequency indicates that these traders seek
to exploit intraday price swings. Finally, we find that traders on TradeStream
trade in an average of 5.7 different currency pairs. While this number is low,
indicating that these traders specialize in a few currencies, this figure is higher
than that of trade leaders, meaning that traders on TradeStream have a wider610
scope when searching for trading opportunities to exploit.
5. Results
In what follows, we present the results obtained from the two methods dis-
cussed previously for each of the data sets.
5.1. Disposition Spread Results615
5.1.1. No Trader Clustering
We begin by calculating the disposition spread, DISP , by aggregating the
realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and paper losses on the basis of
both trade counts and dollar values across all transactions and traders, before
calculating the proportions of gains and losses realized. This analysis is repeated620
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by varying the trading period, t = [1 → 7], and the results are presented in
Table III. We first conduct the analysis using all the observations in both data
sets. Panel A shows that trade leaders on SocialTrade exhibit a positive and
significant disposition spread irrespective of the trading period or the basis used
to calculate the parameters. For example, the DISP spread, PGR, PLR, and625
DISP RATIO for t = 1, are 15.59%, 41.85%, 26.26%, and 1.73, respectively,
when parameters are calculated based on trade count, and 3.85%, 8.6%, 4.75%,
and 2.09, respectively, when parameters are based on trade dollar values. The
disposition ratios for t = 1 indicate that positions exhibiting gains are between
1.73 and 2.09 times more likely to be closed compared to positions that are630
losing. We also point out that as the trading period increases, both the PGR and
PLR converge towards 100%, and the DISP RATIO converges to one. This
is expected in the context of short term trading since all positions, regardless
of profitability, will be closed when considering a long trading period.
Regarding traders on TradeStream, the results presented in Panel B of Table635
III show that, over the period January 2011 to September 2013, traders exhib-
ited positive and significant disposition spreads, which are considerably greater
than those reported for trade leaders on SocialTrade across all trading periods
considered. For t = 1 the DISP spread, PGR, PLR, and DISP RATIO are
25.06%, 53.77%, 28.71%, and 2.52, respectively, when using trade counts, and640
24.21%, 35.08%, 10.86%, and 7.94, respectively, when using dollar values. These
results indicate that traders on TradeStream are between 2.52 and 7.94 times
more likely to close a winning position compared to a losing one. All figures in
Table III clearly show that traders on TradeStream exhibit a greater disposition
effect compared to trade leaders on SocialTrade.645
In order to conduct a more comparable analysis, we recalculate the disposi-
tion spread parameters using an overlapping time frame between the two data
sets, from January 2013 to September 2013. Additionally, we only consider the
common subset of the assets traded on the two platforms, which includes 16
currency pairs. In general, we obtain results and conclusions that are highly650
similar to the analyses on the full data sets. Thus, due to spatial limitations
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and to avoid repetition, we do not present these results in the paper.
All our findings show that, while both trade leaders on SocialTrade and
traders on TradeStream exhibit the disposition effect, this bias is much more
pronounced among the latter.655
5.1.2. With Trader Clustering
We calculate the disposition spread and disposition ratio for each trader and
then average them to obtain overall mean measures for each trading period. This
allows us to account for potential dependence between trades of each trader. The
results are presented in Table IV. Panel A shows the results for trade leaders on660
SocialTrade throughout 2013 and including all assets offered by the platform.
While the PGR and PLR ratios are still high, these figures are closer to each
other resulting in narrow disposition spreads across all trading periods, and even
in a small negative spread when t = 7 based on trade dollar value. Moreover,
all estimates are statistically insignificant as indicated by the low t-statistics,665
which is due to the low parameter values. For instance, the top part of Panel A
in Table IV shows that the trade count of realized gains, realized losses, paper
gains, and paper losses for t ≤ 6 days are very small, which would result in an
insignificant t-statistic. This is due to the fact that trade leaders on average
have around one position open in a given week (see Table I). As such, these670
results should be analyzed with caution.
Regarding traders on TradeStream (Panel B), we find that the disposition
spread is statistically insignificant when using trade count as the basis for calcu-
lating the gains and losses, but it is significant across all trading periods when
using trade dollar values. This inconsistency may be attributed to the issue675
mentioned earlier, where the trade count parameters are very small such that
they result in insignificant test statistics. Nevertheless, the DISP spread based
on trade dollar values for t = 1 is 12.39%, which is almost half the value ob-
tained in the initial analysis where dependency among trades was not taken into
account. Our results indicate that the disposition effect is only present in the680
traditional trading environment and not under the scopic regime.
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For a more comparable analysis, we re-estimate the disposition spreads and
ratios using an overlapping time-frame, from January 2013 to September 2013,
and we only consider the common subset of the assets traded, as we did earlier.
In general, we obtain results that are very similar to those from the analyses685
based on the full data sets; hence, we avoid repetition.
To summarize, we find that when dependencies among trades executed by
the same trader are not accounted for, traders in both scopic and traditional
environments exhibit the disposition effect. However, the disposition effect un-
der the former regime is considerably lower compared to the traditional environ-690
ment. Moreover, when dependencies among transactions are taken into account,
the disposition effect of trade leaders on the STP becomes statistically insignif-
icant, while the disposition effect of traders on TradeStream is only significant
when using the trade dollar value basis, and is around half the estimate obtained
when we do not cluster trades. While we recommend caution when analyzing695
these results due to the low trading frequency in the short trading periods, the
evidence supports our argument that the scopic regime erodes the disposition
effect.
5.2. Cox Regression Results
The results for the entire SocialTrade data set are presented in Panel A in700
Table V. Model (1) shows a positive and significant Gain coefficient of 0.04 and
an odds ratio (O.R.) of 1.04, indicating that a profitable position increases the
hazard rate of the trade by 4%, which is evidence of a small disposition effect.
Next, we fit Model (2a) and find that the Gain coefficient increases to 0.14.
Moreover, long positions increase the hazard rate by 4%, as indicated by the705
O.R. of the Long variable. Regarding limit orders, we find a negative relation
between the take-profit, T/P variable and the hazard rate with an O.R. of 0.27,
meaning that a take-profit order reduces the hazard rate by 73%. The relation
persists even after accounting for the interaction between the T/P and Gain
variables. This result may seem counter-intuitive at first since one would expect710
take-profit orders to increase the hazard rate as profitable positions are realized
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once the market price reaches the take-profit limit. However, the T/P estimate
is the effect of take-profit orders on the hazard rate relative to trades that are
manually closed by the trade leader. One explanation for this result is that
trade leaders place wide take-profit limits, which would require a longer trade715
duration for the market price to trigger the order. As for stop-loss orders, we
find that the S/L variable also has a negative effect on the hazard rate with an
O.R. of 0.74, indicating that stop-loss orders decrease the hazard rate by 26%.
Again, this can be explained by the wide stop-loss limits used by trade leaders,
which would require a longer duration for the price to reach the stop-loss level.720
We argue that the wide take-profit and stop-loss levels are a strategic signalling
mechanism employed by trade leaders where they forgo realizing small profits
in hopes of winning big, which would be perceived as superior trading skill by
potential copiers, while allowing for some flexibility for adverse price swings
by placing a wider stop-loss limit.9 In Model (2b), all previously considered725
variables have a similar expected effect on the hazard rate. With respect to
Leverage, we find that the low leverage ratio of 5 to 1 decreases the hazard
rate while higher ratios have a positive effect that increases linearly. These
results are as one would expect since high leverage ratios translate into large
price swings, which would accelerate trading activity by allowing trade leaders730
to realize sizable gains (or losses) within a shorter period of time. Model (3)
further includes monthly fixed-effects, and the previously considered variables
maintain a similar effect on the hazard rate. The O.R. of the Gain variable
drops to 1.08; however, still providing evidence of a disposition effect. In Model
9In support of our argument, we find that trade leaders on SocialTrade place take-profit
and stop-loss limits 0.04% above and 0.09% below the opening price of a trade, respectively,
while traders on TradeStream place limits 0.001% above and 0.01% below the opening price,
respectively. In dollar terms, trade leaders who use take-profit and stop-loss orders on Social-
Trade have average dollar gains and losses of 30.44 and -65.88 per trade, respectively, while
those on TradeStream show average gains and losses of 24.56 and -56.1 per trade, respectively.
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(4), the O.R. of the Gain variable increases to 1.16, which is around double735
the percentage change on the hazard rate compared to Model (3). In addition,
we find that the one and two lagged-trade log(Duration) variables reduce the
hazard rate by 15% and 12%, respectively. This suggests that trade leaders
tend to stick with a rather consistent trade duration, such that the current
trade duration is likely to be long if previous trade durations were also long;740
nevertheless, this effect decays the higher the duration lag order. Finally, Model
(5) captures heterogeneity among trade leaders and shows an O.R. of 1.31 for
the Gain variable, meaning that a winning position increases the hazard rate
by 31%. This result is evidence of the disposition effect, and is opposite to the
conclusion we obtained using the method of Odean (1998) with trader clustering,745
which showed statistically insignificant results. Given the drawbacks discussed
earlier about calculating the disposition spread in the context of short term
trading, we argue that the Cox model is the superior alternative since it does
not depend on an arbitrary trading time frame. The expected effects of all
control variables are similar to what was previously reported in Model (4).750
Moreover, we report a concordance index and Pseudo-R2 of 85.7% and 86.2%,
respectively, which suggest a good model fit.
The results for the full TradeStream data set are presented in Panel B in
Table V. Model (1) shows an O.R. of 1.75 for the Gain variable, which is
significantly greater than that reported for trade leaders on SocialTrade and755
suggests that a winning position increases the hazard rate by 75%. In Model
(2a), the O.R. of the Gain variable rises to 2.29, and we find a negative but small
effect for the Long variable on the hazard rate with an O.R. of -0.01. Regarding
limit orders, we report an O.R. of 2.17 for the T/P variable indicating that
take-profit orders increase the hazard rate by 117% relative to market orders,760
which is in line with our earlier finding that traders on TradeStream use tight
take-profit limits. Similarly for stop-loss orders, we show that this order type
increases the hazard rate by a factor of 3.72, which is in line with our finding that
traders on TradeStream place tight stop-loss limits. Model (3) shows that the
O.R. for the Gain variable drops to 1.88 after accounting for time fixed-effects;765
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however, it is still significantly greater than the estimate obtained for trade
leaders on SocialTrade. The coefficient estimate for the Long variable, which
was previously negative but close to zero, turns positive and is equal to 0.04. As
for the limit-order variables, they maintain a similar effect on the hazard rate as
found in Model (2a). In Model (4), the coefficients of all previously considered770
variables maintain their expected effect on the hazard rate. In addition, we find
that the one and two lagged-trade log(Duration) variables reduce the hazard
rate by 17% and 13%, respectively. This indicates that the duration of a trade is
likely to be long if prior trade durations are also long; however, this effect decays
the higher the duration lag order. Finally, Model (5) shows that the Gain O.R.775
increases to 2.37, which is significantly higher than the figure obtained for trade
leaders on SocialTrade. This evidence supports our argument that the scopic
regime erodes the disposition effect. All control variables exhibit a similar effect
on the hazard rate as in Model (4).
For a more comparable analysis, we fit the Cox models using the subsets780
of the two data sets with an overlapping time frame, from January 2013 to
September 2013, and we only consider the common assets offered by the two
platforms. We obtain results that are very similar to those of the full data set
analyses, thus we do not report them due to spatial limitations.
6. Conclusion785
In this paper, we investigate the disposition effect of trade leaders on an
STP, which is governed by a scopic regime where individuals are under a state of
constant reciprocal scrutiny and where poor financial performance may tarnish
one’s reputation and adversely impact future compensation. Specifically, we ar-
gue that the scopic environment induces a heightened sense of self-consciousness790
among traders, such that they become instinctively aware of the financial and
reputational risks associated with displaying poor performance. As a result,
traders would choose to close losing positions in order to avoid holding unjusti-
fiable paper losses, while aiming to realize larger gains in order to publicize their
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superior ability. To test this, we use a data set from a popular STP, which we795
call SocialTrade, containing around 2.5 million transactions executed by 77,476
trade leaders, and another data set from a traditional trading platform called
TradeStream, which contains around 6.9 million transactions executed by 22,545
traders.
We apply two empirical methods that are used in the literature. Using the800
measure proposed by Odean (1998), we first calculate the disposition spread
without accounting for dependence among trades and find that, while traders
on both platforms exhibit the disposition effect, traders in the scopic environ-
ment show a lower bias. When we cluster the trades per trader, we only find
evidence of the disposition effect for traders on TradeStream. The second em-805
pirical method employs a series of Cox proportional hazards models, where we
find evidence of the disposition effect for traders in both trading environments.
Nevertheless, we find that the disposition effect of traders in the traditional
financial environment is around two to four times larger compared to that of
traders in the scopic environment.810
While there are some differences in the results generated by the two methods,
the overall comparative conclusion remains same. Specifically, we find ample ev-
idence showing a weaker disposition effect for traders in a scopic environment
compared to traders in a traditional trading setting. The results support our ar-
gument that the scopic regime, through its state of constant reciprocal scrutiny,815
erodes the disposition effect whereby individuals become more self-conscious
about their actions and instinctively aware of the negative consequences associ-
ated with poor performance on their reputation. Consequently, they choose to
close losing positions in order to avoid holding unjustifiable paper losses, while
seeking to realize larger gains as a mechanism to signal their superior ability820
to potential copiers. Our results challenge those presented by Heimer (2016).
However, there are several key differences in the empirical models used and in
the features of the STP employed by the author compared to this paper, which
may explain the divergent conclusions. In particular, we underscore the fact
that during the period of investigation in the author’s study, the STP did not825
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offer traders the mirror trading feature which would allow them to manage the
wealth of others. Hence, these traders did not have a monetary incentive to
build a performance reputation and attract copiers — as is the case for trade
leaders on SocialTrade — which is a factor that we argue is highly significant in
shaping the behavior of traders. As a consequence, trade leaders on SocialTrade830
have a greater sense of awareness of the negative impact of displaying poor out-
standing performance on reputation and compensation, due to the increased
sensitivity to reputational risk that they are subject to under a scopic regime.
Future research is encouraged to investigate how different social trading settings
and tools affect trader behavior and performance.835
Our finding contributes to the literature on prospect theory, which is based
on the notion that gains and losses are valued differently; hence, individuals
base their decisions on perceived gains rather than perceived losses (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). This is due to the process by which individuals frame risky
choices, thus leading to loss-aversion. While such a behavioral pattern is found840
among retail traders in general, we show that a scopic environment erodes the
disposition effect, implying that when individuals are under constant observa-
tion, they alter their behavior from loss-averse to risk-averse. The result is an
adjustment to the utility function such that it is more symmetrical between
losses and gains. This occurs as traders choose to close losing positions, which845
reduces the risk associated with holding on to large unrealized losses. The ra-
tionale that the scopic regime induces risk-averse behavior among trade leaders
as a mechanism to maintain status quo is also supported by evidence presented
by Gemayel and Preda (2018). Specifically, the authors show that trade leaders
under a scopic regime exhibit excess intentional herding as a risk-mitigation850
tool when 1) market information is scarce, 2) the risk (proxied by leverage)
of a publicly-disclosed strategy is low, and 3) when they have more to lose by
underperforming on large positions.
Data limitations in this paper related to social and demographic character-
istics do not allow us to investigate comparable subgroups of traders in the two855
trading environments, or explicitly control for these characteristics. Moreover,
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we are not able to thoroughly investigate the relation between the disposition
effect and performance measures, such as return on investment, due to lack of
information on trader balances in both data sets. To illustrate this point, a gain
of one unit for a trader with a balance of ten units represents an appealing 10%860
return on investment, while the same amount of absolute profit for a trader with
a balance of 100 units translates into a return of 1%. Hence, the attractiveness
of the same amount of absolute profit may be very different for two traders, and
this factor may play a significant role in determining an individual’s tendency
to realize the gain (or loss). We highlight these data limitations as potential865
opportunities for future research.
This study sheds light on how the exogenous characteristics of a financial
environment can alter the behavior or traders. We show that constant scrutiny
can make individuals more risk-averse as they choose to limit their exposure to
losing investments. Such an implication may be valuable to traditional retail870
brokers and regulators, whose aim is to help individuals adopt a more effec-
tive risk management approach. By incorporating some of the social trading
characteristics into traditional online platforms, such as publishing all trading
activities, brokers would be creating a scopic mechanism that is driven by the
collective scrutiny of all participants and that produces a risk-adjustment bene-875
fit at the individual level. Similarly, mutual funds and hedge funds may benefit
by being more transparent with their clients about the performance of their
holdings. Investors in these funds may put pressure on the fund managers to
limit losses and reduce the overall volatility of the portfolio.
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Table III: Disposition Spread for Trade Leaders on SocialTrade and Traders on
TradeStream - No Trader Clustering. The parameters RG, realized gain, RL, realized
loss, PG, paper gain, and PL, paper loss are aggregated across all trades and traders prior to
calculating the proportions of gains and losses realized, given by PGR and PLR, respectively.
DISP and DISP RATIO represent the disposition spread and disposition ratio, respectively.
Finally, the t-statisitc is presented to test for the significance of the disposition spread.
Panel A: SocialTrade - All assets - From January 2013 to December 2013
Parameters are calculated based on trade count.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RG 3,128 7,433 11,733 16,054 20,293 24,670 28,909
RL 1,905 4,541 7,175 9,816 12,374 15,141 17,880
PG 3,115 3,120 3,102 3,122 3,191 3,064 2,916
PL 4,499 4,501 4,532 4,552 4,610 4,541 4,221
PGR 41.85% 62.38% 76.26% 82.06% 85.52% 88.76% 90.76%
PLR 26.26% 44.98% 58.33% 66.29% 71.74% 76.31% 80.59%
DISP 15.59% 17.40% 17.93% 15.76% 13.79% 12.45% 10.17%
DISP RATIO 1.73 1.52 1.35 1.26 1.20 1.17 1.13
t-statistic -18.74 -24.70 -31.23 -32.71 -33.23 -34.83 -32.63
Parameters are calculated based on trade dollar value.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RG 55,264 154,244 251,732 352,896 445,360 547,560 646,198
RL 67,772 198,042 320,078 452,027 571,799 713,897 844,938
PG 833,017 835,434 822,391 828,329 832,224 821,547 795,648
PL 1,673,960 1,681,006 1,671,392 1,697,021 1,715,562 1,663,776 1,633,218
PGR 8.60% 19.19% 27.99% 34.73% 39.39% 45.12% 49.12%
PLR 4.75% 11.63% 17.83% 22.91% 27.12% 31.86% 36.34%
DISP 3.85% 7.56% 10.17% 11.82% 12.27% 13.25% 12.77%
DISP RATIO 2.09 1.85 1.68 1.61 1.50 1.44 1.39
t-statistic -113.81 -164.42 -198.90 -225.77 -234.78 -254.06 -247.30
Panel B: TradeStream - All assets - From January 2011 to September 2013
Parameters are calculated based on trade count.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RG 3,605 8,130 12,626 17,168 21,725 26,196 31,066
RL 1,721 4,011 6,309 8,573 10,919 13,179 15,667
PG 1,449 1,435 1,443 1,434 1,471 1,434 1,517
PL 4,496 4,507 4,519 4,509 4,493 4,539 4,383
PGR 53.77% 71.95% 84.59% 87.82% 89.46% 90.32% 91.23%
PLR 28.71% 45.45% 57.79% 65.19% 70.24% 73.55% 76.55%
DISP 25.06% 26.49% 26.80% 22.64% 19.22% 16.78% 14.69%
DISP RATIO 2.52 1.99 1.66 1.40 1.32 1.25 1.21
t-statistic -27.66 -37.39 -47.54 -47.11 -45.77 -44.61 -43.48
Parameters are calculated based on trade dollar value.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RG 86,684 217,640 348,199 478,432 610,563 740,746 881,173
RL -79,971 -245,032 -413,465 -575,946 -748,657 -906,691 -1,091,677
PG 127,673 126,356 127,233 125,215 126,702 126,175 139,138
PL -934,734 -935,774 -937,786 -932,627 -939,505 -931,639 -926,258
PGR 35.08% 55.88% 69.48% 76.19% 79.56% 82.74% 83.61%
PLR 10.86% 23.70% 33.28% 41.09% 47.22% 51.92% 55.33%
DISP 24.21% 32.18% 36.19% 35.10% 32.33% 30.82% 28.28%
DISP RATIO 7.94 8.65 8.36 11.39 1.98 1.94 1.86
t-statistic -225.04 -345.04 -463.24 -517.00 -532.82 -562.22 -557.97
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Table IV: Disposition Spread for Trade Leaders on SocialTrade and Traders on
TradeStream - With Trader Clustering. The parameters RG, realized gain, RL, realized
loss, PG, paper gain, and PL, paper loss are aggregated for each trader individually prior to
calculating the proportions of gains and losses realized, given by PGR and PLR, respectively.
DISP and DISP RATIO represent the disposition spread and disposition ratio, respectively.
Finally, the t-statisitc is presented to test for the significance of the disposition spread.
Panel A: SocialTrade - All assets - From January 2013 to December 2013
Parameters are calculated based on trade count.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RG 0.92 1.87 2.64 3.30 3.90 4.51 5.07
RL 0.56 1.14 1.62 2.02 2.38 2.77 3.13
PG 0.92 0.79 0.70 0.64 0.61 0.56 0.51
PL 1.32 1.13 1.02 0.94 0.89 0.83 0.74
PGR 21.55% 35.12% 43.10% 47.92% 50.86% 54.25% 56.71%
PLR 16.65% 29.05% 37.26% 42.70% 46.62% 50.99% 55.16%
DISP 4.90% 6.06% 5.84% 5.22% 4.24% 3.26% 1.54%
DISP RATIO 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.85
t-statistic -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 -0.05
Parameters are calculated based on trade dollar value.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RG 16.25 38.87 56.67 72.62 85.53 100.01 113.24
RL -19.93 -49.91 -72.06 -93.02 -109.81 -130.39 -148.07
PG 244.94 210.54 185.15 170.45 159.82 150.05 139.44
PL -492.22 -423.63 -376.29 -349.21 -329.46 -303.87 -286.22
PGR 17.98% 30.18% 37.69% 42.41% 45.26% 48.91% 51.97%
PLR 14.91% 26.63% 34.52% 39.81% 43.51% 47.97% 52.57%
DISP 3.07% 3.54% 3.17% 2.60% 1.75% 0.94% -0.61%
DISP RATIO 14.07 12.92 11.08 11.84 9.64 10.24 9.73
t-statistic -1.08 -1.00 -0.83 -0.66 -0.44 -0.24 0.15
Panel B: TradeStream - All assets - From January 2011 to September 2013
Parameters are calculated based on trade count.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RG 2.04 4.01 5.66 7.25 8.78 10.22 11.77
RL 0.97 1.98 2.83 3.62 4.41 5.14 5.94
PG 0.82 0.71 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.56 0.57
PL 2.54 2.22 2.03 1.90 1.82 1.77 1.66
PGR 36.30% 53.75% 63.73% 69.65% 73.27% 76.22% 78.35%
PLR 23.14% 36.90% 45.54% 51.57% 56.40% 59.81% 63.32%
DISP 13.16% 16.85% 18.18% 18.08% 16.87% 16.40% 15.03%
DISP RATIO 1.18 1.26 1.28 1.29 1.27 1.27 1.24
t-statistic -0.36 -0.51 -0.61 -0.67 -0.69 -0.72 -0.71
Parameters are calculated based on trade dollar value.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RG 49.02 107.40 156.20 202.11 246.76 289.05 333.83
RL -45.22 -120.92 -185.48 -243.30 -302.57 -353.81 -413.58
PG 72.20 62.35 57.08 52.90 51.21 49.24 52.71
PL -528.60 -461.77 -420.70 -393.98 -379.70 -363.54 -350.91
PGR 33.96% 51.59% 61.81% 67.93% 71.61% 74.77% 76.55%
PLR 21.57% 35.12% 43.68% 49.60% 54.35% 57.76% 61.14%
DISP 12.39% 16.47% 18.13% 18.33% 17.26% 17.01% 15.40%
DISP RATIO 44.39 40.96 37.47 35.76 32.71 30.51 27.59
t-statistic -2.68 -3.82 -4.66 -5.19 -5.34 -5.68 -5.53
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